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When Persecution Bleeds into Mass
Murder: The Processive Nature of
Genocide
Uğur Ü. Üngör
Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Amsterdam
In the rapidly developing historiography of the Armenian Genocide, the processive
character of pre-genocidal persecutions has received less attention than
the genocidal process itself. This article treats the persecution of Ottoman
Armenians as a cumulative process leading up to a mass-murder campaign in
the summer of 1915. It addresses the evolution of CUP policy toward the Armenians
through the prism of escalating persecution and the relationship between center
and periphery. In order to illustrate the concrete implementation of this process,
the province of Diyarbekir will serve as an example to clarify the history of
the persecutions.

Introduction
This article will address the evolution of CUP policy toward the Armenians through
the prism of escalating persecution and the relationship between center and periphery,
within the context of the development of general Ottoman population policies
between 1913 and 1915. In this period, the Ottoman Empire was under the rule of
_
the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad
ve Terakki Cemiyeti), or CUP. From
1914 on, a small but radical faction within this semi-official political party,1 having
seized government power, launched empire-wide campaigns of persecution, involving
mass deportation, forced assimilation, and genocidal destruction of various ethnic
communities. Hundreds of Arab, Armenian, Kurdish, Syriac, and other communities
were affected and suffered heavy losses as a result of these forced relocations
and persecutions, which combined with wartime famines due to corruption, failed
harvests due to deportations, and the outbreak of contagious diseases to kill
millions of human beings. The CUP put its policies into practice for the sake of a
thorough ethno-religious homogenization of the empire, resulting in the establishment
of a Turkish nation-state in 1923. In subsequent decades, processes of social
engineering went on, as many CUP potentates remained influential and continued
to formulate and implement new policies of demographic engineering in the
Turkish Republic.
In his book on ethnic cleansing, Norman Naimark notes that ‘‘ethnic cleansing
bleeds into genocide.’’2 More recently, Jacques Sémelin has offered a painstaking
analysis of how precisely this occurs: born out of a political crisis, radical regimes
launch persecutory measures that can subsequently escalate into a genocidal process.3
Scholarly research on the Holocaust has treated this process in great detail and with
sound lucidity.4 In the rapidly developing historiography of the Armenian Genocide,
the processive character of these pre-genocidal persecutions has received less
attention than the genocidal process itself.5 The same may be said of the postgenocidal persecutions and violence.6 This article will address the persecution of
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Ottoman Armenians as a cumulative process leading up to the mass-murder campaign
of the bloody summer of 1915. The province of Diyarbekir will serve as an example to
illustrate this process.
The Ottoman Empire was organized into provinces (vilayet) with governors (vali),
districts (sancak or liva) with district governors (mutasarrıf), counties (kazâ) with
mayors (kaymakam), and communes (nahiye) with directors (müdür). Diyarbekir
was a relatively large province (42,100 km2) locked between the Euphrates in the west,
the Tigris in the east, the plateau in the north, and the desert in the south. Its
continental climate ensured mild winters and extremely hot summers, which at times
paralyzed social life. Historically, Diyarbekir was an administrative center; it
had been the headquarters of the sixteenth-century governorship (beylerbeylişi) from
which large parts of eastern Turkey were ruled.7 On the eve of World War I, the
Second Army was stationed in Diyarbekir city, which also harbored a court-martial
and one of the largest prisons of the Ottoman Empire. Although there were regional
variations in the economic conditions of the province, generally it thrived because of
its favorable location on the ancient Silk Road.8 There were copper mines in
Maden county, and the border regions with Bitlis province were known to be rich in
oil, though no large-scale steps had been taken to exploit either resource. Like the rest
of the empire, Diyarbekir was a pre-industrial region where subsistence farming and
cyclic pastoralism were dominant economic occupations for peasants and nomads
in the countryside.9
Diyarbekir province boasted a formidable diversity of ethnic and religious groups,
whether small or large, scattered or concentrated, urban or rural. Turkish-speaking
Muslims constituted the majority in urban residential areas because they had occupied
most administrative positions for a long time. Armenians inhabiting the cities
made their livings as merchants or craftsmen, and in most bazaars the majority of
tradesmen were indeed Armenian. Some of these were quite prosperous, imbued with
the privilege of having family members abroad and being active in politics. But most
of Diyarbekir’s Armenians were peasants organized in large extended families
(gerdastans) in villages, most specifically in the Lice, Silvan, Beşiri, and Palu
districts.10 The Kurdish population of the province can be divided in several categories:
tribal versus non-tribal Kurds and (semi-) nomadic versus sedentary. The dozens of
large and powerful Kurdish tribes (eşı̂ra) in the region were generally commanded by
chieftains and de facto controlled extensive territories. Many were able to mobilize
thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of mounted warriors, often to combat each
other in pursuit of power, honor, and booty. Non-tribal Kurds could be powerless
peasants (kurmanc) or Kurds from noted clergy families (meşayih). It is important to
point out that most peasants, irrespective of ethnic or religious background, paid
tribute and taxes to Kurdish chieftains and sometimes to other landlords.11 The mere
1,000 Jews of Diyarbekir province owned one small synagogue and were generally an
inconspicuous ethnic group among the much larger Christian and Muslim populations.
They engaged mainly in small-scale trade and some horticulture.12 The Yezidis,
a Kurdish-speaking monotheist people, inhabited villages in the southeastern regions
of the province. Ottoman state discrimination and oppression against them pushed
them into a marginal social status, as a result of which they frequently engaged in
organized brigandry.13 Most of the province’s Arabs lived in Mardin and in the villages
in and around Midyat, numbering no more than several thousand.14 The Syriacs, an
embracing denomination including all Aramaic-speaking Syrian-Orthodox, SyrianProtestant, Syrian-Catholic, Nestorian, and Chaldean Christians, inhabited many
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Figure 1: A bird’s-eye view of Diyarbekir province

villages but especially the southeastern parts of the province. The mountainous region
around Midyat, also known as Tur Abdin, was a Syriac stronghold, with dozens of often
exclusively Syriac villages.15 Though these were only some of the ethnic and religious
groups in the province, because of the absence of reliable demographic data it is very
difficult to come to quantitative grips with even these. In general, it seems reasonable
to contend that approximately one-third of the province’s population was Christian
and approximately two-thirds were Muslim.16
The heterogeneous ethnic and social composition of the population of Diyarbekir
province was fueled by two additional intricacies: vagueness of identity and competing
loyalties. Identities were ethnic, not homogeneous-national in the modern sense. This
complex social reality of considerable overlap and indistinctness of ethnic delineation
defies simple categorizations, as many people lived at the margins of ethnicity.
For example, the Armenians of Mardin spoke Arabic and were mostly Catholic; many
Armenian villagers spoke Kurdish and adhered to a range of rural superstitions,
whereas the Armenians of Diyarbekir city spoke a local Armenian dialect and were
close to the official Apostolic church.17 Tribal cleavages and loyalties were another
issue. Even though Kurdish tribes had hereditary chieftains of Kurdish descent,
they treated their Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike: religious interests and
loyalties were subordinated to tribal ones.
It is crucial to bear these anthropological subtleties in mind before engaging in
any historical analysis of this wide spectrum of peoples. Essentialist notions of
homogeneous national entities engaging in collective action or perpetual conflict are
utterly ahistorical and need to be subjected to thorough deconstructionist criticism.
The same is true for rosy images of a peaceful society in pre-nationalist conditions,
basking in multicultural coexistence.18 Nevertheless, it is possible to state that
the absence, or very feeble presence, of the state and its monopoly of violence in rural
areas allowed for the maintenance of many conflicts, whether tribal or ethno-social.
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Therefore, living conditions were relatively insecure, with arbitrary exertion of
(mortal) violence by certain powerful tribes and state agents. This insecurity
only added to the general atmosphere of distrust and generated anxiety and
vulnerability among the inhabitants of the province.

Preambles: War and Surveillance
The Committee of Union and Progress had not been idle in the provinces before the
war. The first CUP office in Diyarbekir, for example, was opened on 23 July 1908 by
Ziyâ Gökalp (1876–1924), who was a native of the region and became its representative
on the party’s Central Commitee in 1910.19 Gökalp began publishing the newspaper
Peyman, which adopted a relatively modest tone and emphasized coexistence of
the various Ottoman subjects.20 After the catastrophic defeats of the Balkan wars,
the atmosphere changed as relations polarized. The CUP dictatorship exerted its
influence in this province through a network of mainly Kurdish members. The most
influential CUP members in Diyarbekir were those related to the wealthy and
powerful Pirinççizâde dynasty, who owned large estates in the province, including the
rice fields west of Diyarbekir city.21
One of their kinsmen was Deputy Aziz Feyzi (1879–1933), who was known for his
coarseness and fanatic patriotism. He was the son of Pirinççizâde Arif, who passed
away in 1909 and had adhered to the Kurdish Assistance and Progress Society (Kürt
Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti). According to a German report, Feyzi had undertaken
a study trip to Germany in 1911.22 On behalf of many other Kurdish notables,
he vehemently protested in the Ottoman parliament against the proposed government
plan of expropriating land from Kurdish landowners. Feyzi was a CUP hard-liner.
He had held fierce and hostile discussions with an Armenian member of parliament,
Vartkes Serengulian (1871–1915), in which he uttered accusatory and pugnacious
comments.23 He became more and more fanatical in his anti-Armenian views
and reportedly had Ohannes Kazazian, a Catholic Armenian from Mardin and his
political rival in the elections, assassinated in 1913.24 At the outbreak of World War I,
the Ottoman civil inspector Mihran Boyadjian traveled to Diyarbekir and encountered
an energetic Feyzi on the way:
While travelling, we regularly spoke about politics. In his conversations, Feyzi Bey did
not fail to convey certain threats against my coreligionists. ‘‘The Armenians,’’ he
repeated, with bitterness, ‘‘have misconducted with regard to us, during the Balkan
wars in our days of distress. The Catholicos of Etchmiadzin, Patriarch Zaven, and
Nubar have resorted to foreign intervention; that will cost you dearly, my friend, your
future is in danger.’’25

Finally he threatened, ‘‘You will see now, what it means to demand reforms.’’26 Other
CUP sympathizers in Diyarbekir were Pirinççizâde Sıdkı (Tarancı), Yasinzâde Şevki
(Ekinci), his brother Yasinzâde Yahya (Ekinci), and Müftüzâde Şeref (Uluğ), among
others.27
The CUP’s policy toward the inhabitants of the eastern provinces varied between
containment and repression. On 4 April 1914, one day after the outbreak of the
Kurdish rebellion of Bitlis, the Central Committee of the CUP convened to review its
policy toward the eastern provinces. Mithat Şükrü (Bleda) pointed out that Russia was
gradually tightening its grip on many Kurdish tribes in both the Ottoman Empire and
Persia. According to him, another danger was that of Armenian revolutionaries
who were awaiting the right opportunity to revolt and could strike at any time. He
concocted a divide-and-rule strategy and maintained that on no account should
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Kurdish and Armenian politicians be allowed to unite. He suggested that the CUP
should now adopt a more sophisticated stick-and-carrot strategy, enrolling potentially
loyal chieftains through rhetoric and bribery while threatening potentially disloyal
ones with deportation and incarceration.28
The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on
28 June 1914 stirred up acute international tensions. In the midst of this belligerent
atmosphere, the CUP sought to forge alliances with any of the Great Powers in
order to help the Ottoman Empire emerge from its diplomatic isolation. Cavid Bey,
the pro-British minister of finance, had appealed to Britain in 1911, but, apart from
Winston Churchill, the Foreign Office was not interested.29 Talât flirted with Russia in
May during his trip to the Crimea, where he spoke to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Sazonov about a possible alliance. The Russians expressed ambivalence in judgment
but, in essence, were not interested.30 Cemal Pasha approached France but left emptyhanded, lamenting the negotiations with the French as ‘‘a huge disappointment.’’31 On
28 July, the same day that Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, Enver Pasha
proposed a defensive alliance between Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire to
the German ambassador, Hans Wangenheim. In the next days Grand Vizier Said
Halim, Chairman of the Parliament Halil, Enver, and Talât launched intensive
negotiations with the Germans behind closed doors. Finally, on 2 August, one day after
the German declaration of war against Russia, a written agreement was signed
between the two states and a general mobilization was issued by the Ottoman general
staff.32 The discussions were top secret, and even Cemal Pasha had no knowledge of
them.33 Three days later Austria-Hungary joined the Turko-German alliance and
completed the Central Powers bloc, while Russia, France, and Britain united into the
Triple Entente. The Ottoman Empire was now officially allied to Germany and,
through the treaty, was inevitably obliged, in this political constellation, to prepare for
war. Following the succession of declarations of war in August 1914, the Germans
urged the Ottoman minister of war, Enver Pasha, at the end of October to act against
Russia. Without a formal declaration of war, Enver ordered the Ottoman navy to bomb
the Russian shore immediately, destroying oil tanks and sinking fourteen vessels.34
Though few politicians in Istanbul knew of Enver’s action, this fait accompli triggered
declarations of war by the Triple Entente powers. From 11 November 1914 on, the
Ottoman Empire was officially at war with Russia, France, and Britain.35
Although World War I immediately engulfed the Ottoman Empire, this was not
incidental. The CUP consciously headed in a belligerent direction, and by participating
in the war it hoped to find a radical solution to the empire’s many problems. From
the first day of the war, the CUP’s dictatorial rule became more repressive toward all
opposition groups. Discordant behavior of internal and external dissenters was dealt
with systematically and ruthlessly. The Ottoman Armenian community, suspected of
collective disloyalty, was one of the first targets. On 6 September 1914, Talât ordered
the Ottoman security apparatus to closely ‘‘follow and observe’’ (takib ve tarassud)
the local leadership of Armenian political parties that, according to Talât, had been
engaging in ‘‘agitation and disturbance’’ (mefsedet ve melanet) against the notion
of Ottomanism all along.36 Another perceived problem was the foreign capitulations, a
set of legal concessions under which foreign subjects enjoyed privileges such as
exemption from Ottoman taxes. The CUP regarded the capitulations as humiliating37
and did not wait long to confront them: all capitulations were unilaterally abrogated
on 17 September.38 The CUP’s bold policies not only directly caused the ranks to
close, they also led to an indirect form of Turkification, as some government officials
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simply left office voluntarily. On 12 November, Minister of Commerce Süleyman
Bustani, a Syriac Protestant, resigned from his cabinet portfolio in protest over what
he considered ongoing CUP aggression.39 This trend allowed the CUP to fill these
administrative positions with nationalists, and, although their Gleichschaltung40 was
never implemented perfectly, it was sufficient for effective rule.

Brutalizing War, Radicalizing Persecution
Meanwhile, the mobilization did not go unnoticed in Diyarbekir province. The city
_
streets swarmed with soldiers of the Second Army Corps, led by Ahmet Izzet
Pasha,
which was partly lodged in large mosques such as the Nebii Mosque.41 On 3 November,
the mayor of Diyarbekir made a public speech, explaining the conduct of the war to an
exclusively Muslim crowd. Upon hearing that the Russian army was pushing into the
provinces of Van and Erzurum, the frantic crowd yelled, ‘‘Praise to Mohammed! Death
to the Russians and their allies!’’ The non-Muslims of the city, frightened and cautious
because of this outbreak of mass rage, did not leave their homes in the following
days.42 The army began requisitioning goods from the population and drafting men
into the army. Daniel Thom, a missionary in Mardin, summarized these acts and wrote
that ‘‘the Govt. has robbed the city, and the country around, of its men, of its animals,
of its money,’’ leaving the people ‘‘pennyless, shops all closed.’’43 Gradually, the
Armenian elite of Diyarbekir was targeted and persecuted. Coinciding with his earlier
order, on 29 November Talât ordered the arrest of Thomas Muggerditchian, former
interpreter for the British consulate in Diyarbekir. Muggerditchian was accused of
espionage for the Entente Powers and was to be court-martialed.44 He escaped arrest,
fled to Egypt, and subsequently wrote his memoirs.45
From September 1914 on, the CUP began drawing up formations of irregular
brigands in order to invade Russia and Persia to provoke war. This secret military
organization was integrated into the existing Special Organization (Teşkilât-ı
Mahsusa).46 The cadre of these new guerrilla bands (çetes) was to be made up of
convicts, Kurdish tribesmen, and Muslim immigrants, and they were to be led by the
same gangsters the CUP had used in the Balkan wars and in prior political conflicts.
The convicts, called ‘‘savages and criminals’’ even by CUP officials,47 were very often
tribesmen, local outlaws, and bandits who had committed theft or manslaughter.
According to an Ottoman bureaucrat, they were drilled in Istanbul for one week before
being deployed in various regions.48 The entire operation was led by Dr. Bahaeddin
Şakir and was kept out of the control of the Ottoman army as much as possible.49 On
18 November, Talât personally ordered the drawing up of lists of names of ‘‘those
convicts who were able to exert influence on tribes.’’50 A week later, the Special
Organization was put together in Diyarbekir. Among the members enlisted in the
paramilitary organization was the Zaza brigand Alo,51 as well as the Chechen criminal
Hamid and his group of loyal warriors. Hamid was recruited by CUP Responsible
Secretaries who cabled the following notification to the Central Committee in Istanbul:
The courageous brigand Chechen Hamid, resident of the town of Reşadiye in the
Bergama district, has requested help to assist the army with some of his comrades and
if allowed, form a significant corps in Diyarbekir. Since we hope that aforementioned
gentleman is able to serve in this way, their dispatch will benefit the homeland.
We would like to request a telegraphic answer on whether their patriotic venture will
be necessary or not, and present our compliments, dear brothers.52

During the winter of 1914, the brigands began penetrating into Russian and Persian
territory to incite the Muslim populations to rise in rebellion and join the Ottoman
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forces. In this guerrilla war, Special Organization operatives such as Yenibahçeli Nail,
Deli Halit, and Topal Osman also attacked Armenian villages, plundering, raping, and
killing with impunity. Ambassador Wangenheim wrote to the German chancellor that
their anti-Russian actions across the Erzurum border frequently escalated into
‘‘encroachments and clashes’’ against Armenian villagers.53
The war on the eastern front gained momentum when warmonger Enver Pasha,
driven by expansionist designs toward the east, on 29 December attempted to attack
the Russian army in Sarıkamış. Enver insisted on waging an encirclement
campaign through the rugged Kars mountains. However, the Russian general
Nikolai Yudenich anticipated the outflanking maneuver, outsmarted Enver, and
delivered a heavy blow to his forces. Enver’s attack failed miserably, and as a result
the Third Army was effectively wiped out. Of the 90,000 soldiers who fought in
the battle of Sarıkamış, approximately 78,000 perished, mainly through frostbite.54
The CUP leadership was convinced that the disastrous defeat had been caused by
‘‘treacherous Armenian elements.’’ Retreating Ottoman soldiers took revenge
on Armenian villagers, massacring many and pillaging their goods. After returning
from the front, Enver wrote a letter to the Armenian prelate of Konya, expressing
his respect and admiration for the courage the Armenian soldiers had shown in
the Sarıkamış battle. Enver gave the example of Sergeant Ohannes, who had received
a medal for valor.55 This may not have been how Enver really felt. In a
personal discussion with publisher Hüseyin Cahit, Enver bitterly blamed the
Armenians for the fiasco and proposed their deportation to somewhere where they
wouldn’t cause trouble.56
The defeat triggered a new wave of persecution, especially in the front-line
provinces of Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van. On 26 December 1914 Talât ordered
‘‘the dismissal of all Armenian police officers, police chiefs, and government employees,
and the deportation of anyone who opposes these measures.’’57 Talât Pasha’s
involvement in the dismissal of Armenian government officials typifies his ‘‘micromanaging’’ qualities. In February he urged local officials to keep him abreast of the
developing situation with regard to Armenian civil servants.58 When he got the
impression that the firings were not proceeding quickly enough, he personally had
Police Chief Krikor and police officers Armenag, Boghos, and Shahin of the Van police
squad removed from their offices and deported to Mosul.59 Finally, in November 1916,
the Interior Ministry issued an official declaration sanctioning the dismissal of all
Armenian and Greek police officers.60 These official decrees marked an acceleration in
CUP suspicion of Armenian loyalty to the Ottoman state.
For the population of Diyarbekir, there was little to celebrate between Christmas
and New Year’s Eve 1914. The news of Enver’s losses reverberated in Diyarbekir
and had a detrimental effect on local morale. The war was experienced closely and
emotionally, since both Muslims and Christians had been drafted into the army and
many of them had perished in the Sarıkamış campaign. The bad news distressed
both communities and strained their relationships, sparking suspicion and enmity.
The Church of Saint Ephraim was vandalized and property was stolen, while
gendarmes beat up a Syriac village headman.61 The governor also prohibited the use of
all non-Turkish languages in some of the province’s institutions, such as the American
hospital and the French mission.62 In February 1915 the government initiated arms
searches in Christian houses in Diyarbekir. During these violent searches, the
inhabitants were accused of treason and espionage and of hiding guns in secret arms
stores. On 18 February, twelve young men of the large Syriac village of Qarabash were
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sentenced to death on charges of alleged desertion. Four of them were publicly hanged
in the central square in Diyarbekir in order to deter potential deserters.63 When their
compatriot villagers protested against the execution, gendarmes clubbed two men to
death and dispersed the group.64
March also saw the disarming of Armenian soldiers and their recruitment,
together with many other Christian men, into labor battalions.65 The cadre of these
battalions were deemed disloyal elements, as an official decree proscribed them ‘‘at all
costs’’ from taking up arms in the regular Ottoman army.66 The labor battalion
conscripts were deployed in road construction under dire circumstances in and around
Diyarbekir. Irrespective of weather conditions, every individual, including teenagers,
was forced to carry a daily load of fifty-five kilograms. Each battalion was
escorted by two dozen soldiers. Many conscripts in the labor battalions perished of
exhaustion, exposure, and maltreatment. On 5 March 1915 a Syriac native of
Diyarbekir, Abed Mshiho, was conscripted in a labor battalion numbering 1,100 men
and assigned to work on the Diyarbekir–Aleppo road. According to his account, the
maltreatments increased every other day, with bastinados and other beatings
becoming commonplace, and the violence escalating into sporadic murders of
individual conscripts by late March.67
March 1915 was perhaps the most fateful month for the future development
of the Ottoman Empire in general and of Diyarbekir province in particular.
The naval attacks upon the Dardanelles strait and the Russian move toward
Van sowed panic in the hearts and minds of the CUP leaders.68 This reinforced
their established fear of a nightmare scenario in which Armenian disloyalty would
pave the way for an Allied incursion into Anatolia. This apocalyptic suspicion led to
a series of meetings of the Central Committee in Istanbul in mid-March. As a result
of these gatherings, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was delegated substantial authority to
deal with ‘‘the inner enemies.’’ The Special Organization was reorganized, expanded,
and placed under his jurisdiction.69 The army was given more autonomy, on Talât’s
orders, to ‘‘turn to the Third Army for the application of measures aimed at Armenian
actions.’’70 Not much later, Talât imposed total censorship on the Armenian newspaper
Azadamart and sent Osman Bedri, police commissioner of Constantinople, to
confiscate their presses.71 This radicalization at the center metastasized to the
periphery as Diyarbekir saw the appointment of its new governor: Dr. Mehmed Reşid.

Center and Periphery: Minister Talât vs. Governor Reşid
On 25 March 1915 the governor of Diyarbekir, Hamid Bey, was relieved of his duties
and replaced by Dr. Reşid. Mehmed Reşid (Şahingiray) was born in a Circassian family
in Russian Caucasia on 8 February 1873. When the czarist government intensified its
campaign against the Circassians in 1874, his family fled to the Ottoman Empire.
Reşid grew up in Istanbul, where he enrolled in the Military School of Medicine and
joined other students to found the kernel of a secret political party that would later
adopt the name CUP. In 1897 the Abdulhamid regime exiled him to Tripoli for his
politically recalcitrant activities. Having made a career in the army and risen to the
rank of major, he wrote a book on the CUP revolution in 1908. He was never influential
in the CUP core, however, and his power did not compare to that of party bosses such
as Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir or Dr. Nâzım. In 1909 he relinquished his employment in the
military and went on to serve as district governor and mayor in several provinces
between 1908 and 1914. Along his professional path Reşid gradually radicalized and
scapegoated Christians as the reason for the empire’s erosion and wretched condition.
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By 1914 he was thoroughly convinced that the Ottoman Christians were abusing their
ostensibly privileged position and were thus to blame for the empire’s depressed
economy. He was delegated the task of secretary-general of the international reform
plan for the eastern provinces, which was annulled when the CUP engaged in war.
In 1915 he became governor of Diyarbekir, and in 1916 he was appointed governor of
Ankara. When the war was over, he was arrested and incarcerated in Istanbul. With
the assistance of his former henchmen, he escaped from prison and lived incognito at
various Istanbul addresses. Fed up with being forced to evade the law, and fearing
arrest and possible execution, he committed suicide when a police chief tracked him
down on 6 February 1919.72
When Reşid acceded to the governorship of Diyarbekir province, he brought with
him thirty, mainly Circassian, Special Organization operatives, including Çerkez
Harun, Çerkez Şakir, and Çerkez Aziz.73 They were joined in Diyarbekir by more
troops released from the local prison.74 In this way, Reşid absorbed more effective
power than the average Ottoman governor. For Reşid, it was certainly true that ‘‘in the
provinces party bosses of one kind or another often exercised substantial control,
amounting in some cases, [. . .] to virtual autonomy.’’75 Upon arrival in Diyarbekir,
Reşid and his men faced poor rule of law, a serious desertion problem, and an anxious
population. The bazaar, for example, was buzzing with rumors that the Russians had
invaded Istanbul.76 The Muslims feared an invasion of Diyarbekir by the Russian
army, whose reputation as a valiant fighting corps had preceded its offensive into the
south. The Christians were torn between fear and hope: whereas one moderate group
(including the clergy) was terrified that a Russian incursion might trigger reprisals,
another, discordant group (notably Armenian nationalists) expressed the audacious
belief that it was possible for Christians to defend themselves against the brutal
policies of the CUP dictatorship.77
The concerns of many young men were of a more pragmatic nature. They wanted
to avoid the possibility of being conscripted into the Ottoman army and sent off to
an almost certain death, either at the front or in the labor battalions. Therefore,
some had actually gone into hiding in the complex web of rooftops of Xançepek,
a neighborhood with a large concentration of Armenians. Some of these draft evaders
had acquired weapons.78 Dr. Floyd Smith, an American doctor on the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), reported that at the end of February,
the Armenian bishop Tchilgadian finally ‘‘went upon the roofs and lectured the men,
telling them that they were bringing ruin upon themselves and the whole Christian
quarter. As a result quite a number surrendered.’’79 Still, both Muslim and Christian
deserters remained when Dr. Reşid became governor.
In a post-war booklet titled Mülâhazât (‘‘Reflections’’),80 Reşid defended and
sought to legitimize his wartime policies as governor of Diyarbekir. These memoirs,
composed of two of his four wartime notebooks (the other two were lost), are
of extraordinary importance, as they allow a close look at his line of thought when he
was appointed governor. From the moment he set foot in Diyarbekir, Reşid found
confirmation of his expectations of a conspiracy of disloyal Christians. He wrote,
My appointment to Diyarbekir coincided with a very delicate period of the war. Large
parts of Van and Bitlis had been invaded by the enemy, deserters were transgressing,
pillaging and robbing everywhere. Yezidi and Nestorian uprisings in or at the border of
the province required the application of drastic measures. The transgressive, offensive
and impudent attitude of the Armenians was seriously endangering the honor of the
government.81
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In his memoirs Reşid especially targets the Armenians, accusing them of ‘‘high
treason’’ (hıyânet-ı vataniye) and of ‘‘pursuing the goal of an independent Armenia’’
(müstakil bir Ermenistan gayesini takib).82 In his paranoia and animosity Reşid
ignored the many Muslim deserters and imagined an army of Armenian deserters, who
in fact may not have been as countless and organized as he visualized. He believed
that the Armenian draft dodgers on the rooftops were all ‘‘formidably’’ (müdhiş)
organized revolutionaries and that they numbered more than a thousand.
Furthermore, according to Reşid, ‘‘there was not a single Armenian in the province
who was not participating in this national endeavor.’’83
In order to deal with these perceived problems, Reşid organized a committee for the
‘‘solution of the Armenian question.’’ This council was called the Committee of Inquiry
(Tahkik Heyeti) and had its own Militia Unit (Milis Alayı) at its disposal.84 According
to a German charity worker, the committee, made up of a dozen CUP loyalists, was
‘‘a sham committee for the solution of the Armenian Question’’ and served only one
purpose: to eliminate the Hunchak and Dashnak parties.85 It was headed by Colonel
_
Mustafa Bey (Cemilpaşazâde) and consisted of deputy Aziz Feyzi; postal clerk Ibrahim
86
Bedreddin; Majors Rüşdü Bey and Yasinzâde Şevki (Ekinci); the latter’s brother
Yasinzâde Yahya (Ekinci); representative of the Directorate for the Settlement of
_
Tribes and Immigrants (Iskân-ı
Aşâir ve Muhacirı̂n Müdüriyeti, or IAMM) and
director of the Diyarbekir branch of the Society for National Defense (Müdafaa-ı
Milliye Cemiyeti) Veli Necdet; police chief Memduh Bey; militia commander Şevki Bey;
and Şeref Uluğ, son of the mufti.87 On Reşid’s orders, they selected the following
civilians and appointed them to the rank of captain: Zazazâde Hacı Süleyman
(by profession, a Zaza butcher in the Diyarbekir bazaar); Halil (also a butcher);
Cercisaşazâde Abdülkerim; Direkçizâde Tahir; and Pirinççizâde Sıdkı (Tarancı). The
following volunteers were nominated to the rank of lieutenant: Halifezâde Salih,
Ganizâde Servet (Akkaynak), Muhtarzâde Salih, Şeyhzâde Kadri (Demiray),
Pirânı̂zâde Kemal (Önen), Yazıcızâde Kemal, Zaza Alo Efendi, and Hacı Bakır.88
At that time, a certain Hacı Zeki of Lice, a fanatical activist, incited the locals of
Mardin to take up arms against the Christians. Zeki convened groups of Muslims at
his house in Mardin city, where he made inflammatory political speeches, openly
calling for pogroms. The district governor of Mardin, a moderate man by the name of
Hilmi, was displeased by Zeki’s aggressive vilification. Since the outbreak of the war
Hilmi had shown consistent efforts to restrain conflict and to maintain relative
stability and moderate rule. He reprehended Zeki and expelled him from Mardin.
Zeki then took off to Diyarbekir, where he found willing partners among the CUP elite
who were just consolidating their rule in the provincial capital.89 On 6 April 1915 Talât
_
ordered Reşid to ‘‘appoint a capable, loyal, and devout Ittihadist
for the vacant position
90
of mayor’’ in Diyarbekir. Reşid immediately fired the relatively mild Cemilpaşazâde
Dr. Fuad Bey and replaced him with the rabidly anti-Armenian Sıdkı.91 Police chief
Dersimli Hüseyin Bey was replaced by IAMM boss Veli Necdet, who had previously
occupied the office of provincial secretary.92 All the key positions in Diyarbekir were
now occupied by CUP loyalists.
In Diyarbekir, Reşid now embarked on a relentless campaign to find and punish
deserters. On 1 April he issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of all arms
to the police.93 When this failed to produce the results he had expected, he intensified
the arms searches from 5 April on. Aided by his gendarmerie commander, Major
Rüşdü, he personally supervised and participated in the warrantless searches of
churches and houses.94 While district governor Hilmi in Mardin visited the Christian
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clergy to congratulate them on Easter,95 Reşid’s roundups of Armenian men became
more and more arbitrary and categorical. As he wrote, ‘‘On a certain day I had the
three or four most important streets in the Armenian neighborhood barricaded
and ordered surprise searches on every single house in the early morning, arresting
more than 500 armed deserters.’’96 By 15 April Reşid had already had more than
600 Armenian notables and artisans arrested and put in jail. There he had them
tortured to exact confessions on the locations of hidden arms depots. The prisoners
were beaten and burned with hot irons, had their nails pulled out with pliers,
and suffered prolonged bastinado.97 Even so, Reşid was not satisfied with what had
been accomplished and wired Istanbul twice to request the deployment of more
manpower to assist his force of 300 gendarmes and policemen. The Interior Ministry
did not comply with his requests, frustrating and galvanizing him into more severe
measures.98

The Cultural Side of Persecution: Book Burnings
Heinrich Heine’s drama Almansor contains a passage in which a fifteenth-century
Spanish Muslim named Hassan, upon witnessing the burning of the Koran by
Catholics, pronounces the following sentence: ‘‘That was only a prelude: there where
books are burned, ultimately people are burned.’’ The destruction of books considered
hostile cultural property seems to be a feature of practically all state-sponsored
violence. A peculiar aspect of the operation in the Ottoman Empire was the hunt
for ‘‘recalcitrant’’ books and other texts, generally written in non-Ottoman languages.
In Ottoman political jargon, unpatriotic material was branded ‘‘harmful documents’’
(evrâk-ı muzırre)99 and had to be dealt with through counter-propaganda or violence.
During their nationalist rule, the CUP confiscated and destroyed an unknown
but undoubtedly large number of non-Turkish-language works.
The example of the dismissal of Ottoman Armenian government officials
demonstrates Talât’s close involvement in the supervisory process of the antiArmenian persecutions. It is therefore not surprising to come across evidence of his
micromanaging, with surgical precision, the bureaucratic excision of Armenian culture
from Ottoman society. A striking example is the fate of the books in the library of the
Armenian lyceum of Sivas. In October 1916 Talât was disturbed by the idea that the
library kept ‘‘important volumes on the condition of the Ottoman Empire in French,
German, English, Russian, and Kurdish,’’ and he ordered ‘‘the immediate seizure of
these books and their dispatch to Istanbul by post.’’100 Five months later, when the
books still had not been sent, he repeated his order, requesting that the books be sent
‘‘urgently.’’101 Although one can only speculate as to the fate of these books, examples
from Diyarbekir province demonstrate that it is most likely they were destroyed.
In Diyarbekir it was common for the authorities to target and destroy books.
As Floyd Smith wrote, ‘‘Books and papers were sure to bring condemnation to a
household.’’102 On 22 April Reşid’s men went from door to door in the Xançepek
and Fatihpaşa neighborhoods to find books. The Syriac tailor Habib had warned the
inhabitants to hide their books, especially books in the French and Armenian
languages. The militia also paid a visit to the Armenian bishop Tchilgadian
and accused him of hiding arms in secret niches in the large Armenian church of
St. Sarkis. They raided his room, took away all his books and documents, and sent
them to Reşid for examination. The next day the books were publicly burned.103
Vahram Dadrian was a young boy keeping a diary when he was deported with his
family from Çorum. After many trials and tribulations, they arrived in the Syrian
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desert and met an Armenian man named Pakrad, who had just escaped from
Diyarbekir. Pakrad told them that his father, Abraham, had been caught up in the
book searches. A corporal took two of their books and walked out of the house, facing
a frantic crowd of Muslims:
The corporal gestured to the crowd to shut up. ‘‘Listen! Look here. Look what we found
in his home,’’ he yelled, lifting a geography book into the air. ‘‘You don’t know how to
read, so you don’t know how dangerous this book is. But I won’t have to say much before
you can draw your own conclusions. In the hands of our enemies this book is a more
terrifying weapon than all the guns and cannons of the army. This book gives the
locations of all the cities, villages, rivers, and roads in Turkey. All of them meticulously
portrayed. Anybody who goes through this book can find not only the plan of every city,
but also the location of every house and whether it belongs to a Christian or a Muslim.
They have marked each one with a cross or a crescent, so that one day when they rebel
it will be easy for them to tell a Muslim household from the others.’’ Grumbling from
the mob—arms into the air in defiance! ‘‘Oh, oh, oh . . . clobber him, kill him, let him rot,
the traitor.’’ ‘‘Please, calm down. Not so fast,’’ the corporal ordered with authority,
‘‘I haven’t finished yet. Look. Here’s another book.’’ He held up another book—a physics
text. ‘‘It tells you all you need to know about how to make gun-powder, bullets, and
dynamite. These conspirators’ homes are filled with books like this. Both the young
and the old read these books and learn what to do to destroy our country.
But thank God and the Sultan that we have been vigilant and were able to uncover
their plot at the last minute. Now it’s we who will destroy their homes and put their
children to the sword.’’ The policemen had a hard time clearing a way through the
violent crowd. They finally succeeded and, pulling and pushing their victim, they took
him off to jail.104

Together with other owners of targeted books, Pakrad’s father Abraham died in jail,
where the chances of either escape or survival were very slim.
One of many examples of book burnings during the Armenian Genocide is
the destruction in July 1915 of the library of Addai Sher, the Chaldean Bishop of
Siirt, which contained thousands of books.105 The library of the Saint John Church
in Mardin was also confiscated106 and the books given away to stores in Mardin or
sold for practically nothing.107 A teacher at the Syriac monastery of Deyrulzaferan
noted in his memoirs that, thanks to the government’s carte blanche to certain Kurdish
tribes to attack Christians, the other important Syriac monastery, Mor Gabriel,
was attacked in the fall of 1917 by the Kurdish brigand Şendi, who massacred
inhabitants and destroyed the library.108 However, attacks on books and libraries
were generally coordinated by the government. In the 1920s, Hasan Reşit (Tankut)
oversaw the confiscation of ‘‘many books written in foreign languages,’’
including minority languages such as Kurmanci, Zazaki, Syriac, and Arabic, during
the post-war campaign to continue homogenizing Anatolia.109 Government agents
often stumbled over books when dealing with recalcitrant elements. When Alişêr,
a Kurdish chieftain-poet famous for inciting the Eastern Kizilbash population
against the authorities, was killed, a coffer of his books was confiscated by the
Kemalists.110

Targeting the Elite and Experimenting with Mass Violence
In late April, the Diyarbekir city prison was swarming with prisoners. Reşid ordered
the large caravanserai of Diyarbekir evacuated, as every day several dozens of
prisoners were locked up and tortured in that khan.111 But these violent persecutions
were not limited to Diyarbekir. In April a gradual shift occurred from discerning
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between combatants and non-combatants to not differentiating them anymore. This
momentum is exemplified by the crucial battle of Van, which had very high stakes for
all parties. The Van front saw mutual indiscriminate massacring of Muslims by the
joint Russo-Armenian forces and of Christians by Ottoman forces.112 The antiArmenian measures at the national level now became more and more categorical as
well. Moreover, inspired by the brutalizing war in Persian Azerbaijan and in
Transcaucasia, they were also gaining ‘‘total’’ traits: more and more violence was
applied to more and more people. Fear of Allied landings on the western coasts added
fuel to the fire. As a result, the CUP began incarcerating dissidents and assailing
the Armenian community all over the Ottoman Empire. Beginning on 24 April 1915,
the political and cultural elite of the Ottoman Armenian community was targeted
for arrest and deportation to the interior. With very few exceptions, these men
were tortured to death over the next several months. Simultaneously, deportation
convoys to the interior were rerouted to Der el-Zor in the Syrian desert. The
persecutions soon increased in intensity and were extended to larger parts of
the Ottoman Empire.113
In Diyarbekir, Reşid had not been distinguishing himself at all since his arrival.
His intensive arms searches of the first three weeks of April had delivered some results
for his militia, as, indeed, arms were found. The scope of armament and the extent of
its organization were blown out of proportion, and photos were taken of the armaments
and of the culprits.114 On 27 April Reşid wired an elated telegram to Talât
summarizing and evaluating his work in Diyarbekir:
For ten days, the pursuit of deserters has been carried out with utmost severity.
As a result of yesterday’s purges a significant amount of explosives, fifty bombs,
lots of ammunition and various arms, and a great deal of dynamite powder were
found. One hundred and twenty leaders and operatives of the villages were taken into
custody. Until now, in the city alone more than 1,000 deserters of different regions
have been apprehended, many of whom are party members. Searches and pursuit are
continuing.115

Having incarcerated the bulk of the political elite of the Diyarbekir Christians, Reşid’s
militia now targeted their religious leaders. Blanket arrests of priests and monks were
carried out, and their houses were ransacked. In Mardin, where Reşid’s persecutions
had not yet taken hold, the news from Diyarbekir nevertheless caused fear. The
Armenian Catholic bishop Ignatius Maloyan had become anxious about the worsening
situation and seems to have written a letter to his co-religionists, lest something
happen to him. Maloyan’s letter urges his parish to remain calm and loyal to the
government; he wrote, ‘‘Above all, never lose your faith in the holy trinity.’’ The letter
was sealed and entrusted to the Syriac Orthodox Bishop Gabriel Tabbuni on the first
of May.116
While the war was raging with great intensity on the eastern front, the CUP
began questioning the loyalty of the Ottoman Armenians even more. On 5 May 1915
Talât authorized the Third Army to disarm all Armenian gendarmes in Diyarbekir.117
This way, even loyal Armenians were categorized as disloyal and treated as such.
The next day the Directorate for Employment and Supplies of the Ministry of
Economy ordered all its offices to fire their Armenian staff and ‘‘deport those of
whom it is necessary to areas where there are no Armenians.’’118 Having already
arrested these men in Diyarbekir, Reşid proceeded to persecute the city’s clergy
and extend the arrests to the villages. On 9 May he summoned the Chaldean priest
Hanna Soha in Mardin to come to Diyarbekir for interrogation. Upon his arrival,
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the militia publicly maltreated him before killing him in broad daylight in the
street.119 The absence of constraints in this murder emboldened the militia and
triggered a new wave of arrests and violence, this time targeting the surrounding
villages as well. The predominantly Christian villages of Kabiye, Qarabash, and
Qatarbel, all situated on the plain of Diyarbekir, were subjected to brutal arms
searches by Yasinzâde Yahya and Pirinççizâde Sıdkı between 10 and 20 May.
The village men were tortured by bastinado, and dozens were taken away to
the capital, filling the prison and the caravanserai.120 German charity worker
Friedrich Schuchardt wrote that ‘‘between the 10th and 30th of May another 1,200
of the most notable Armenians and other Christians of Diyarbekir province
were arrested without distinction between the religious denominations.’’121 Reşid
then imposed the death penalty on any Armenian going outside the city walls.122
Diyarbekir had become an open-air prison and its Armenian neighborhood a de
facto ghetto.
The persecutions also spread into the countryside, most notably to Mardin city,
which was still ruled by Hilmi Bey, who had stalled and resisted anti-Christian
persecutions in his district. On 15 May Reşid sent Aziz Feyzi to organize the round-up
of the Christian elites of Mardin. During a secret meeting in which dozens of Muslim
notables participated, a plan was laid out for the crackdown on the Mardin elite;
however, this was practically impossible to carry out with Hilmi in office.123 Talât was
still busy micromanaging the national persecution of the Armenian elite. On 19 May
he ordered the Hunchak leader Paramas court-martialed in the Diyarbekir prison and
inquired into the whereabouts of one Krikor Nalbandian.124 On 22 May he requested
information on the Armenian politicians Agnouni and Rupen Zartarian, and their
colleagues.125
A critical event in Diyarbekir was the first large massacre involving the total
destruction of entire village populations. On the morning of 20 May 1915 Reşid ordered
Yahya and Sıdkı to disarm Qarabash, a village just northeast of Diyarbekir. The
village was invaded with fifty men and thoroughly disarmed; even bread knives were
seized. Its men incarcerated, its weapons confiscated, Qarabash was now completely
emasculated. That same evening Yahya and Sıdkı visited neighboring Kurdish
villages, inciting them to attack Qarabash and explicitly giving them fiat to plunder.
Two days later, on 22 May, the village was invaded by mounted Kurds, who massacred
its population with daggers, axes, and swords. Its two priests, Paulus and Behnam,
were trampled to death under the horses’ hooves. The women were raped, the
houses were burnt, and valuables were seized.126 The few survivors fled to Diyarbekir,
where some of them were treated by Floyd Smith. Smith reported the arrival of the
Qarabash survivors as follows:
May 21, 1915, there came to our compound in Diarbekir from the village of Karabash,
three hours to the east, three or four wounded and the following day (May 22) over a
score of wounded Armenian and Syrian women and children. They, the villagers, told
of a night attack by the Kurds three days previous and that the next morning the
government had sent gendarmes who refused to allow anyone to come to Diarbekir.
Some managed to get away and finally all who could walk or be carried came on the
dates mentioned. The wounds were practically all infected and I have classified them
as follows: [. . .]
(c) Wounds made by heavy cutting instruments, probably axes. [. . .]
2. Two children about seven and nine years and one woman; attempted decapitations.
Deep incised wounds of the nape of the neck (just below the skull), 5–8 inches long and
of a depth equal to the thickness of the muscles of this region.127
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On that same evening, the 160 families of the village of Kabiye were targeted.128
The terrified villagers—some remaining men but mostly women, children, and the
elderly—had taken refuge in the Mor Kiryakos church. Sıdkı had persuaded Ömer,
Mustafa, and Emı̂n, three sons of Perı̂xan, matriarch of the Reman tribe, to cooperate
in the raid. They brought with them dozens of tribesmen, who combed the village for
hemp rope to tie the men together. On Sıdkı’s orders, the men were tortured with hot
iron pins, while women and girls were raped in the church. Within five hours, the
militia and the tribesmen had hacked the villagers to death with axes. Many were
crammed into haylofts and barns and burned alive. After the massacre, the Reman
brothers loaded two saddlebags with money and gold and carried the goods away.129
The few survivors escaped to Diyarbekir, where some were killed by gendarmes. One
woman stated that she survived the massacre ‘‘between the corpses of her relatives’’
(men bayn lashat herbo). When she fled to Diyarbekir city, a Zaza family proposed to
take her into their home, but she refused out of fear. Another survivor, a boy, escaped
death by hiding in a vineyard, which was overgrown by that time of the year. He was
the only male survivor of the Kabiye massacre.130

Five to Twelve: The Beginning of the End
In April 1915, some Armenians had already been sporadically deported from their
native regions, though this was not an empire-wide campaign. The deportation of the
entire Armenian millet was officially organized from 23 May 1915 on, when Talât
issued orders for the wholesale deportation of all Armenians to Deyr-ul Zor, starting
with the northeastern provinces.131 That same day he urged the Fourth Army
Command to court-martial any Muslim who collaborated with Christians.132 The
Third Army had been put under the command of General Mahmud Kâmil Pasha,133
who had issued a similar order. His orders instructed ‘‘any Muslim who protected
an Armenian hanged in front of his house, the burning of his house, his removal
from office, and his appearance before a court-martial.’’134 These massive arrests
and persecutions prompted the Entente Powers to make a joint declaration on 24 May,
denouncing CUP policies against the Armenians. The declaration vehemently
criticized these ‘‘new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization’’ and
promised ‘‘that they will hold personally responsible . . . all members of the Ottoman
government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.’’135
The CUP leaders, especially Talât, panicked and attempted to disguise the
deportations, requesting permission from the Grand Vizier on 26 May to issue a
temporary deportation law. Although the deportations had already begun, the
Grand Vizier endorsed Talât’s law on 29 May, rushing the bill through Parliament
the next day. This legislation gave a legal veneer to the official inception of
the deportation of all Ottoman Armenians to the Syrian desert, authorizing the
army to proceed with this project and delegating its daily implementation to
the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants.136
The Armenian Genocide had now officially begun.

By Way of a Conclusion
The persecution process of the Ottoman Armenians was an internal campaign that
ran parallel to the external war effort with the Great Powers, especially on the
eastern front against Russia. It was no coincidence that most of the direct killing of
non-combatant Ottoman Christians would occur in the eastern provinces, where the
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threat of a Russian invasion backed by ‘‘Armenian insiders’’ was most immediate in
the paranoid minds of the CUP dictatorship. However, the persecution was mostly
an autonomous process and was only partly linked to the ebb and flow of the war.
The initiation and conduct of the persecutions were in the hands of civilian
bureaucrats in the Ministry of the Interior, not those of military personnel in the
Ministry of War. The Ottoman province Diyarbekir has served as a platform for
exemplifying these policies at the local level. The following two main arguments of
this study may provide benchmarks for future research.
First, in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide, Talât Pasha’s role has not
yet received the attention it deserves. His role as a micromanaging dictator operating
from the center crystallizes from a detailed inquiry into archival documents of
the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior. From the most sweeping of categorical macromeasures to the micro-level dismissals of hundreds of individuals, Talât was very
much personally involved in the persecution. The overall direction of Ottoman
government policies toward Armenians may seem incongruous and contradictory at
times,137 and more research on the nature of the CUP dictatorship would clarify this
issue. The relationship between center and periphery can be illustrated by counterposing Talât’s leverage as minister to Reşid’s executive power as governor. In the
period between January and April 1915 Talât ordered the surveillance of Armenians to
be accelerated. Eager to satisfy his superior, the overachieving Reşid took local
initiative and applied considerable overkill in dealing with the issues at stake.
Once the governor began experimenting with wholesale killing and demonstrated its
efficiency, he also transgressed a moral boundary. From then on, Talât would not
hesitate long to authorize the expansion of murder from individuals to groups.
Second, the Armenian Genocide did not fall from a clear blue sky. As in all
instances of genocidal violence, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact timing of the
initiation of the mass violence. As Donald Bloxham has pointed out, the Armenian
Genocide arose incrementally out of the mechanism of cumulative radicalization: local
radicalization was conveyed back to Istanbul, which in turn triggered new phases of
persecution.138 In other words, the output of the system was returned to its input in
order to regulate further output. Therefore, it is practically impossible to speak of
an absolute starting point. Nevertheless, two stages represent critical turning
points in the entire process as points of no return: the general arrests of 24 April
1915 and the general deportation orders of 23 May 1915. Without these
policy directives at the central level, the massive scale of the ensuing genocide
would not have been reached.
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_Idari Taksimatı,’’ Tarih Dergisi 22 (1969): 23–24.
_
Ibrahim
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Aziz Feyzi was both Ziyâ Gökalp’s and Şeref’s cousin, and Sıdkı was related to both of them
on his maternal and paternal sides. Malmı̂sanij [pseud.], Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti
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BOA, DH.ŞFR 47/243, Talât to Diyarbekir, 28 November 1914.
Thomas Mugerditchian, Dikranagerdee Nahankee Tcharteru, Aganadesee Badmoutiun
(Cairo: Djihanian, 1919). This book is alternately titled Dikranagerdee Nahankin
Tcharteru yev Kurderou Kazanioutounneru (Cairo, 1919).
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See the official order in Kâmuran Gürün, Ermeni Dosyası (Ankara: Bilgi, 1988), 276.
Qarabashi names nine Armenians who were led away and killed. Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho,
62, 64–66.
Should the Entente navy penetrate the Straits, Talât promised that the Ottomans would
blow up the Aya Sofia and retreat into the Anatolian heartland, whence they planned to
resist and repel the Entente. Talât laughed at US Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s
protests, saying that not even six men in the CUP would care about the building. Henry
Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Ann Arbor, MI: Gomidas, 2000), 132.
_
For a detailed reconstruction of this decision-making process, see Taner Akçam, Insan
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A müftü (mufti) is a Muslim jurist who is versed in Islamic religious law (the shari’a) and
provides binding advice on its application.
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following day, the ministry had to deal with the replacement of the Armenian postal clerk
responsible for the delivery of mail beween Diyarbekir and Siirt. Although there were no
other qualified employees available, it warned that the new postal clerk must not be an
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